Uneven distribution of resources and unequal access to power in the current phase of postcolonial late capitalism has spurred a range of critical discourses globally that has led to the formation of "transnational counterpublic spheres". These counterpublics facilitate interests of disenfranchised groups to become visible and audible. However, counterpublics are also spheres of power that replicate mechanisms of exclusion. My paper aims to explore, on the one hand, to what extent transnational counterpublic spheres succeed in facilitating resistance and agency, enabling marginalized collectives to find a "voice" in international politics. On the other hand the mechanisms of exclusion will be investigated that obstruct the inclusion of subaltern groups.
totalitarianism by making the state accountable to its citizens.
This involves access to information regarding the functioning of the state apparatus so as to facilitate critical scrutiny through generation of public opinion. Via legally guaranteed free speech, free press, and free assembly, public opinion is then transmitted to the state (Fraser 1992, 112-3) . Public spheres promise the possibility of free and fair deliberation for all participants by virtue of being open and accessible to all citizens, by suspending inequalities of status and rendering private interests inadmissible. Habermas of course admits that the full utopian potential of the bourgeois conception of the public sphere has not been realized in practice. Amongst the many reasons for this are the fragmentation of the public into competing interest groups and the emergence of welfare-state mass democracy wherein instead of reasoned public debate, mass media monopolizes the manufacture and manipulation of public opinion.
Fraser highlights several limits in Habermasian public sphere: from his idealization of the liberal public sphere to his exclusion of categories of race, gender, religion etc. One of her strongest objections is that it allows bourgeois men to present themselves as the "universal class" thereby justifying their fitness to govern (ibid., 114) . Deconstructing the public/private divide, Fraser unpacks the conflicts that are a constitutive aspect of the emergence of the bourgeois conception of the public sphere, Transnational Justice, Counterpublic Spheres and Alter-Globalization Localities, Vol. 2 87 which she critiques as a "masculinist ideological notion that functioned to legitimate an emergent form of class rule" (ibid., 116). In contrast Fraser argues that people are hindered from participating because it is impossible to simply "bracket off" one's social status. In stratified societies, social inequalities impede free and fair deliberation. She proposes that "transnational subaltern counterpublics" intervene in asymmetrical discursive relations among differentially empowered publics through a proliferation of a multiplicity of competing publics, in which subaltern groups can invent and circulate counter-hegemonic discourses and identities. As socially vulnerable groups are not able to have their interests represented in political systems with the same ease as the more privileged actors, transnational subaltern counterpublics enable subaltern agency by extension of democratic voice to previously marginalized groups. By inserting new actors into the political stage through reappropriation and resignification of political discourses, this instigates deliberation on issues of redistribution, recognition, and representation as well as on the constitution of a new social grammar.
One of the most celebrated examples of a "transnational subaltern counterpublic" is the World Social Forum (Santos
2005). As a counter-event to the World Economic Forum in
Davos, meetings of the WSF are applauded for enabling diverse marginalized collectives to find a "voice" in international politics.
As an "open space" for "critical utopias", the World Social Forum has emerged as one of the most important and influential transnational counterpublic spheres, which opens up possibilities for dissident voices to formulate critique against the neoliberal bias of global norms und international institutions. In the next section let us examine how alter-globalization movements in general and the World Social Forum seek to address struggles of marginalized groups.
Another World is Possible: Transnational Counterpublics and Alterglobalization
Economic globalization has led to deregulation and privatization of markets resulting in the increasing movement of transnational capital, goods, and also people. Popular notions such as the "global village" evoke images of a world "shrinking" due to advanced communication technology. Corporate values are established at the epicentre of our socio-political systems further consolidated through international and national structures, which facilitate the mobility of capital and speculative finance. Economic policies focus primarily on the competitive benefits for businesses, whereby social and economic well-being of the masses is rendered secondary to the interests of the corporate sector and transnational elites. The nation-states, especially in the global South, have been forced to accept and are sometimes even actively pursuing globalization.
International corporations pressurize them to create favourable conditions for free movement of capital, the lack of which leads to trade embargoes and international isolation. Thus, the world is being shaped to meet the demands for predictable, market-friendly conditions wherever corporations and investors choose to operate. The consolidation of the dominance of multinational corporations has been accompanied by the erosion of legitimacy of nation-states with corporate managers becoming more powerful than democratically elected representatives. On the other hand, politicians are continually recrafting the state to attract foreign investment, which is justified in the name of enhancing national interests (Sklair 2008, 219) . The discourse of national competitiveness in the global market has led to alliances between globalizing politicians, the transnational capitalist class, and the corporate sector. Most social institutions like schools, universities, hospitals, are being corporatized (ibid.). Critics of neo-liberal globalization draw attention to the dangers of the new 'market fundamentalism' that corrodes democracy.
Champions of globalization, however, view it as the emergence of a new, complexly networked, disjunctive order that cannot be explained in terms of centre-periphery models. This contests understandings of globalization as simply the Westernization or Americanization of the world. In contrast to the "cultural imperialism" of older forms of globalization, current manifestations promise to "provincialize Europe" through hybridization and difference, which enable the articulation and enunciation of a new transnational imaginary, thereby challenging homogenization and standardization. The focus here is on the influence of local practices and struggles on global politics as well as the strategies deployed by postcolonial societies to negotiate with as well as contest the imperial centre. Challenging imperialist globalization is at the heart of these movements, which address concerns of groups as diverse as Roy have become embodiments of radical politics who manage to capture headlines for the initiative, but risk marginalizing and making invisible the struggles of subaltern groups, even as they claim to speak about/for them. This has resulted in a legitimacy crisis of the WSF with the accusation that a small number of insiders make the important decisions. It is argued that oppressive power relations globally are also at work within alter-globalization movements.
Despite being an "open space" located in the global South, the WSF has not been able to achieve "parity of participation" for subaltern groups, who cannot access transnational counterpublic spheres. Thus even as the WSF has been celebrated as a platform for disenfranchised groups and communities to articulate their perspective and be heard by the "ruling elites", the continual production of subalternity within these spaces of dissidence remains a serious challenge for alter-globalization movements.
Despite good intentions, the WSF remains demographically limited.
Politics of the Governed
At this point it is instructive to engage with the critique put 
Transnational Subaltern Counterpublics: A Paradox?
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, from whom Fraser takes the term "subaltern", explains that when a citizen is unable to claim the public sphere, itself a creation of colonial history, a certain kind of subalternity is produced (Spivak 2008, 3, 154) .
Subalterns are non-hegemonic groups, in so far as their dissident political practices are not perceived to be systematic and coherent in their opposition to power. Designated as "pre-political" and sporadic, they are seen to operate at "local" levels and thus as insignificant for international politics. This is a condition of not being able to represent oneself or, to use Subaltern groups are marginal to nation-building even as they bear the impact of neo-colonial globalization. According to Spivak (1999, 402) subalternity is "the Other of the question of diaspora", whose forgetting makes possible marginality claims by the upwardly mobile metropolitan migrant. The exclusive focus on migrancy, diaspora, hybridity, cosmopolitanism, implies that resistance and agency are framed through discourses that privilege motion and travel, while neglecting the lack of access to mobility of disenfranchised communities (Yeĝenoĝlu 2005, 104) .
Their insertion into processes of globalization is discontinuous from diasporic migrants in the First World metropolis (ibid.).
Access to globality is highly uneven, whereby even as metropolitan diasporics can claim tools of democratic rights and equality, this is not available for the underclass in the Third World (ibid.). Not in the circuit of mobility, forced international migration is not even an option for subaltern groups, who do not have access to even basic benefits of citizenship, even if they are de jure citizens (ibid., 105).
Against this background, it is a challenge to reconstruct counterpublic sphere theories with an eye on the question of subalternity. In much of the postcolonial world "class apartheid" (Spivak 2008, 32 ) is produced by the system of education in place since formal decolonization. The largest sector of the future electorate in the world, namely, the children of the rural poor in the global South are systematically deprived of any access to intellectual labour with only their bodies being prepared to serve the ruling class. The only weapon with which the extremely deprived can fight is effectively taken away from them at a very early age as they are never taught to think that anything exists to serve them (Spivak 2007, 172) . To reverse this process, the subaltern must be inserted into hegemony not through "empowerment training", rather by "activating" habits of
democracy. An immense effort is required to convince a subaltern that everyone has the same inalienable rights. This is also a challenge for the feminist postcolonial theorist to not take the public sphere for granted and understand that it is not present everywhere in the same way. In fact Spivak provocatively says that there is an overdose of the concept of the public sphere in the global North (ibid, 174).
An even bigger challenge than lack of access to public space is that the subaltern perceives its condition of disenfranchisement as "normal". History of domination changes to the present of exploitation, with the capacity to intuit the public space being taken away from the subaltern. Imagining oneself in the abstract as part of the nation-state is a privilege that the subaltern is robbed of, so that it is completely "unprepared" for the public sphere. The biggest task of decolonization is to bring subalternity into crisis. However, this cannot be achieved solely through making the subaltern economically independent.
Poverty alleviation is of course necessary, but is no guarantee of justice and equality (ibid, 24f.). Following Gramsci, who argues that the problems of subaltern groups will not be solved by "dictatorship" of the proletariat, Spivak argues that she is interested in justice, but this is not simply about organizing material goods for the suffering classes. Simply having rights is not enough if there is no training in practice of freedom so that letter of law can be claimed in spirit. Otherwise political power remains an empty promise.
The relation between economic and political empowerment remains discontinuous. Formalized democratic rights do not automatically enable economically impoverished citizens, even as economic empowerment does not translate into desubalternization.
Neo-liberal governmentality fabricates entrepreneurial subjects who are expected to flexibly adapt to changing market demands.
This shifts the responsibility for one's wellbeing from the state to the individual who must be self-regulating and self-disciplined.
The conflation between citizens and consumers makes consumer choices in the market continuous with the "will of the people" in a democracy.
Spivak warns that the processes of decolonization cannot be successful only through crisis-driven corporate philanthropy or impatient human rights intervention. NGOs building schools or Human Rights Watch shaming states into good behaviour is necessary but not sufficient, whereby without the ethico-political education of the disenfranchised, the project of decolonization will fail again and again (2009, 36) . Following Gramsci, she emphasizes that democracy cannot mean merely that an unskilled worker can become skilled and employable; it rather entails every "citizen" being able to "govern" with the society placing him, even if only abstractly, in a general condition to achieve this (ibid.).
Aristotle claimed that not all persons were fit to become part of the governing class because not everyone had the necessary practical wisdom or ethical virtue. Actual governmental practices in most postcolonial societies are still based on this premise that not everyone can govern. The challenge that Spivak poses is:
How can the subaltern subject be transformed into a citizen?
She critiques the impatience of human rights interventionists, even as she is wary of promises of "justice under capitalism" offered by development politics. According to her, the alterglobalization lobby only copes with managing capitalist globalization as crisis, and is insufficiently oppositional.
Critiquing the "impatience of the World Social Forum and its idealist love affair with the digital", she laments that "alterglobalization is at best based on a hastily cobbled relationship between the intellectual and the subaltern" (ibid.). She warns against regarding unmediated cyberliteracy as an unquestioned good, whereby for her electronic broadening of access does not automatically translate into epistemic transformation "uncoercive rearrangement of desires" (ibid.). Economic empowerment is incomplete without the accompanying "epistemic change" both in the global North as well as the global South (1993, 177) , so that the vastly disenfranchised will not need to be patronized by aid. We urgently need to rethink and To conclude, instead of for and against state discussions, the focus needs to be on how the interests and demands of disenfranchised groups can be articulated in the struggle for hegemony, through institutionalization of the redistributive functions of the state (ibid.). At the same time, while critiquing the dominant mode of doing politics in the metropolis, we need to recuperate a sphere of politics that has been a permanent source of anxiety for theorists of modernity and democracy the vast domain that exists outside the designated spheres of modern politics. The effort should be to enable subaltern groups to make claims on the state within the formal grammar of rights and citizenship to activate a "democracy from below".
